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Executive Summary 
 
The ongoing review of the UK’s Fourth Carbon Budget is closely linked to the debate over the 
impact that domestic climate change policies can have on the competitiveness of businesses. 
Notably, there are concerns that, if the UK implements more ambitious climate policies than its 
trading partners, carbon-intensive producers might relocate. 
 
This could mean that some affected sectors may have to reduce their production of goods and 
services below the optimum level that would be achieved if there were uniform international 
climate policies. In addition, the impact of climate change policies on emissions reductions could 
be limited if big emitters simply relocate, especially if they move to jurisdictions that have lower 
environmental standards. 
 
This paper investigates to what extent these concerns are substantiated and whether they 
justify a change in the UK’s ambitions for reducing its emissions, including the Fourth Carbon 
Budget. It does so by drawing on a range of ‘ex-ante’ and ‘ex-post’ studies. 
 
‘Ex-ante’ studies aim to predict the outcome of intended policies. They use simulation or 
generalised economic models with explicitly chosen theoretical foundations (such as cost-
minimising behaviour by profit-maximising producers, or average-cost pricing). Such models are 
informed by broad empirical evidence about the behaviour of firms. ‘Ex-post’ studies, on the 
other hand, estimate the impacts of existing policies on business behaviour, using actual 
evidence and data gathered after their implementation. 
 
The paper also provides recommendations about how to ‘create a level playing field’ i.e. how to 
design policies that can mitigate the undesirable impacts of climate change policies so that UK 
businesses can compete on more equal terms with their international counterparts. It also 
highlights the complementary benefits associated with policies that increase a country’s 
capacity to compete in a global race for low-carbon innovation over the coming century. 
 
Competitiveness ─ impacts in theory and in practice 
 
Economic theory generally suggests that if domestic climate change policies are introduced 
before other countries act, they can increase production costs and prompt the relocation of 
emissions-intensive activities ─ and the emissions they cause ─ abroad. This is often described as 
‘carbon leakage’. The results from ex-ante studies tend to vary greatly but, in general, they find 
that some carbon leakage can occur, especially in specific energy-intensive sectors. 
 
By contrast, ex-post empirical studies suggest that the policies currently in place to meet the UK 
carbon budgets have had little or no impact on business competitiveness and carbon leakage. 
Similar results are obtained for studies applied to the European Union. In particular, there is no 
compelling evidence that investments in Europe have been cancelled, or production moved, 
because of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) or, in the UK, because of the 
Climate Change Levy. 
 
We suggest that the absence of evidence for impacts on competitiveness is not surprising given 
the relatively low carbon prices that have prevailed under current policies in the UK and Europe 
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and the existence of compensatory measures, such as the allocation of free permits within the 
EU ETS. 
 
At present, variations in carbon costs are relatively minor drivers of investment and location 
decisions when compared with other factors, such as the prices of energy and raw materials, the 
cost of labour, market characteristics, institutional frameworks and demand shifts. 
 
But carbon prices are likely to rise in order to meet constant or tightening emissions targets. 
Without targeted compensation for trade-exposed energy-intensive sectors, there could be 
some relocation of business activities, if the carbon prices become high enough. Analysis by the 
Committee on Climate Change (2008) suggests that the sectors which may be more exposed to 
higher carbon prices in the UK include iron and steel, refined petroleum products, aluminium, 
other inorganic chemicals, pulp and paper and rubber tyres. 
 
Creating a level playing field 
 
It seems unlikely that there will be a single global carbon price which affects all firms evenly, at 
least in the short to medium term, so it makes sense to implement measures that can help to 
‘create a level playing field’ for businesses that are subject to domestic policies. 
 
Ideally this could be achieved through multilateral or bilateral agreements in different sectors, 
or some form of carbon tax adjustment at the border. However, it will probably take time to 
reach effective agreements along these lines. 
 
In the short term, while the UK fulfils the domestic commitments set out in the Fourth Carbon 
Budget and the Budgets to follow, other measures can be implemented at national level to 
reduce the impact of unilateral carbon pricing. Indeed, some measures have already been 
introduced. In some cases, compensation may also be justified to facilitate the transition within 
carbon-intensive sectors (to re-skill and re-tool production in order to reduce emissions, for 
example), or, from a ‘political economy perspective’, to attain buy-in from lobby groups 
representing carbon-intensive industries. But these efforts must be efficient in the allocation of 
scarce public funds. 
 
There is evidence to suggest that the measures that are currently in place, such as free emission 
permits within the EU ETS and sector discounts or exemptions from national policies, are often 
too generous. In some cases they can provide firms with windfall profits and the only effect is to 
cause consumer prices to rise without preventing relocation of emissions abroad. Compensatory 
measures should therefore be carefully targeted, to avoid costly over-compensation and 
undesirable market distortion. 
 
In terms of policy design, there is no rationale for discounts on carbon pricing as these would 
weaken the signal to reduce carbon emissions efficiently. Instead, compensation could be 
offered through reductions in corporate or labour taxes, for instance, and could be linked to 
support for low-carbon investment or research and development. However, such lump sum 
payments may still allow for some relocation, without reducing carbon leakage as producers opt 
to ‘take the money and run’. To prevent this, the level of compensation should be proportional 
to the level of domestic output. 
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Economic competitiveness at state and regional levels 
 
‘Whole economy competitiveness’, defined in terms of economic performance relative to other 
countries, is a different concept to ‘business competitiveness’. Correspondingly, the analysis 
carried out in this paper covers not just vulnerable sectors, but also the impact of climate 
policies, such as the UK’s carbon budgets, on the potential growth and productivity performance 
of the UK’s economy as a whole relative to other trading partners. 
 
Well-designed climate change policies could offer business opportunities in fast-growing global 
markets, as countries, such as the United States, China and the Member States of the European 
Union, implement ever more stringent carbon reduction and energy efficiency policies. The UK 
is well-positioned to benefit from a global transition to a more resource-efficient and renewable 
economy, provided flexible structural policies allow it to utilise its comparative advantages. 
 
Policies that encourage the flow of resources from declining and less productive activities to 
growing and more productive activities are likely to increase the UK economy’s capacity to 
adapt profitably to change. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Arguments in favour of revising the Fourth Carbon Budget, based on concerns about 
competitiveness, do not appear to be supported by the evidence. Existing data suggest that the 
impact of current policies is small or negligible, dwarfed by a range of other economic factors. 
 
Domestic, as well as international, carbon prices are expected to increase, and with time this 
could have serious implications for a small group of energy-intensive businesses. Some 
businesses will naturally exit the market as demand for carbon-intensive goods and services is 
expected to gradually fall. But policy tools are available to ensure that strategic vulnerable 
sectors are not put out of business prematurely by the application of more ambitious domestic 
climate change policies. 
 
At the macroeconomic level, climate change policies can increase competitiveness in the long 
term, making firms more innovative and productive in rapidly growing world markets. The right 
mix of policy tools can help businesses, and the UK economy as a whole, to realise the potential 
new market opportunities associated with the transition to low-carbon growth and the 
fulfilment of domestic climate change targets. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The UK’s emissions reduction targets, embedded in the Climate Change Act and in its five-year 
carbon budgets, have already required, and will require in the future, the implementation of a 
number of domestic climate change policies which generally impose a direct or indirect price on 
carbon. Concerns about these policies have been raised because of the risk of harming the 
competitiveness of British businesses, especially through potential increases in energy costs. 
This threat has led to the introduction of special treatments for businesses for which the risk of 
relocation is higher, such as tax reductions (as in the case of the Climate Change Agreement) or 
free emission allocations (as in the case of the European Union Emissions Trading System). 
 
However, there have also been calls to reduce the ambition of domestic climate change policies 
altogether. Indeed, the review of the Fourth Carbon Budget has re-opened the debate about 
whether domestic objectives should be revised if there is sufficient evidence that they damage 
business competitiveness. 
 
In providing its advice about the review of the Budget, the UK Committee on Climate Change 
(CCC, 2013a) found no evidence of significant industry relocation due to low-carbon policies. 
More generally, the Committee did not find any significant change to the circumstances which 
prevailed at the time at which the budget was initially agreed, and concluded that there is no 
legal or economic case for reducing its ambition1.  
 
This paper aims to contribute to the debate about the possible revision of the Fourth Carbon 
Budget due to the impact on competitiveness. It discusses the available evidence about the 
effect of climate change policies on competitiveness, and suggests options for creating a level 
playing field, while also highlighting possible business opportunities associated with changes in 
comparative advantages. 
 
‘Competitiveness’ is a relative term. The world cannot become more ‘competitive’ but 
countries, businesses and sectors can. However, the precise meaning of the term varies 
depending on the level at which it is defined. 
 
For businesses and sectors, improvements in competitiveness essentially depend on the ability 
to produce either cheap or innovative products that the world wants to buy, and that allow 
market shares, sales and profits to expand. This may be a ‘zero sum’ game in terms of the 
fortunes of companies, in so far as one firm’s gain in competitiveness might be a rival’s loss, or it 
might help to create new markets for both businesses. 
 
Measuring national competitiveness requires a very different framework. An economy cannot 
go out of business, though it may build up foreign debt. Depending on factor endowments, a 
country will always have a comparative advantage in trading something in an open market. 
Competitiveness at the national level, therefore, tends to refer to performance-related 
outcomes, such as productivity and output per head, or the underlying conditions necessary to 
generate higher productivity and sustainable wealth for a country’s citizens, through, for 
                                                 
1
 The Climate Change Act states that a carbon budget can only be changed if ‘there have been significant 
changes affecting the circumstances on which the previous decision was made’.  
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example, improved educational standards, investment in infrastructure, scientific prowess and 
political and legal stability. 
 
In order to try to capture these multifaceted aspects of competitiveness, the first part of the 
paper explores the impact of policy on businesses, while the final part discusses the effects at 
national and regional level. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: after this introductory section, Section 2 provides an 
overview of the relative contributions of current energy and policies to overall business costs, 
and Section 3 illustrates the key findings from a selection of ‘ex-ante’ studies of the theoretical 
impacts of climate change policies on carbon leakage and competitiveness. Section 4 provides 
insights from ‘ex-post’ studies on the actual effects of existing policies, and Section 5 discusses 
possible ways to create a level playing field for businesses that are subject to different climate 
change policy regimes. Section 6 broadens the discussion to cover economic competitiveness at 
the state and regional level, and Section 7 summarises the paper’s main conclusions. 
 
This paper is part of a broader series of policy papers which explore issues associated with the 
review of the Fourth Carbon Budget. A companion paper by Bassi et al. (2014) focuses on what 
the UK’s trading partners are doing in terms of climate change policy and legislation, exploring 
whether or not the UK is truly acting alone. Another paper by Grover and Zenghelis (2014) uses 
the latest National Accounts Supply Use tables to determine what impact a hypothetical carbon 
price above current levels would have on UK industries, identifying which sectors would be most 
acutely affected. 
 
2 Businesses, energy and competitiveness: the big picture 
 
Energy costs are often regarded as a significant burden for the business sector. The recent 
debate in the UK over energy bills, both for businesses and households, has put climate change 
policies under the spotlight, as some of them result in a carbon price that raises energy costs. 
 
However, when compared with other drivers of performance, energy costs appear to be 
relatively small for most sectors. In 2011, UK businesses spent in total around £158 billion on 
energy2 (ONS, 2013) which, on average, accounted for less than 6 per cent of total variable 
cost3, or 12 per cent of gross value added (GVA). By comparison, labour costs were £820 billion, 
almost 30 per cent of variable costs (60 per cent of GVA).  
 
But while energy costs are, on average, much lower than labour costs, high energy prices are 
often regarded as a significant threat to the UK economy. This is a common feature of industrial 
                                                 
2
 Total energy costs include coal, lignite, coke, natural gas, crude and refined petroleum, and electricity. 
3
 The term ‘variable costs’ used here refers to the UK Office for National Statistics’s Total Output at Basic prices 
and includes: total wage costs, gross operating surplus, and taxes minus subsidies, as well as total intermediary 
consumption at purchasers’ prices. By contrast, Gross Value Added (which corresponds closely to GDP) nets off 
intermediary consumption because these are inputs into production and not final outputs. GVA is therefore 
the appropriate measure of final net output at the ‘whole economy level’, and has been used extensively in 
the literature. However, from a sectoral point of view, input costs (intermediate consumption) are just as 
relevant as a constituent of the sector’s total costs as labour and capital, so it is the relevant metric to use 
here. 
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economics as, in general, it is easier to lobby for lower energy prices, which are seen as strongly 
influenced by government policy, than lower wages, which are seen as determined by the 
markets and are unlikely to be the basis for a politically popular case. 
 
Typically, labour costs also change in a more predictable manner while energy costs can 
fluctuate significantly, along with energy wholesale prices. For instance, Brent crude oil prices 
increased in real terms by around 74 per cent between 2000 and 2013 (EIA, 2014). By 
comparison, average salaries increased by only 10 per cent over the same period (ONS, 2014).  
 
And when energy prices rise, they tend to erode profits at the margin. Businesses with low 
profit margins can be affected even by relatively small changes (see, for example, Webster and 
Ayatakshi, 2013). 
 
Furthermore, energy intensity varies significantly across sectors. While an increase in energy 
costs may have a limited impact on most businesses, it can have significant implications for 
those industrial activities characterised by a relatively high share of energy costs. In the UK, 
energy costs represent about 15 per cent of variable costs for the cement, ceramic and fertiliser 
manufacturers sector, 21 per cent for iron and steel, 17 per cent for other basic metal and 
casting, 22 per cent for pulp and paper, 28 per cent for fishing, and 33 per cent for dyestuff and 
agrochemical production (ONS, 2013). For industries directly involved in energy production or 
transformation, such as electricity generators, gas suppliers and petroleum refineries, the share 
of energy costs is even higher, above 70 per cent. While these energy-intensive sectors are only 
a subset of all UK industries, they remain an important contributor to the UK economy. In 2011 
they accounted for about 9 per cent of the total UK output (ONS, 2013). 
 
Among the different components of energy costs, it is policies that typically attract most 
criticism from the business sector. However, analysis by the European Commission shows that 
the cost of current climate change policies is a relatively small component of the overall energy 
costs paid by firms (Eurostat, 2014). 
 
For instance, Figure 1 shows the electricity costs incurred by moderately high energy-using 
businesses in the European Union. The data indicate that total electricity costs for UK businesses 
are slightly higher than the European average, but policy costs are smaller. Similar conclusions 
can be drawn for other energy-user categories. 
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Figure 1. Retail price of electricity by component, industrial consumers of between 70,000 and 
150,000 MWh/year in 2012 (p/kWh
4
) 
 
Note: Lithuania is not included due to lack of data 
Source: Eurostat (2014) 
 
The cost of climate change policies is likely to increase further in the future, as the UK complies 
with its carbon budgets and its longer term emission reduction targets that are set out in the 
2008 Climate Change Act. The impact of climate change policies, however, may still be smaller 
than expected. 
 
In the UK, applying a US$30/tonne (around £195) price on carbon dioxide, on top of current 
costs, would have the effect of raising the oil price by the equivalent of US$14 a barrel. The 
comparison with oil prices is not perfect, since these are set internationally and in principle 
affect all firms equally, while carbon prices, if set unilaterally, affect only domestic firms. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to compare the effect of such a carbon price with the wide energy 
price fluctuations experienced in the past 15 years. For instance, oil prices were around 
US$20/barrel in 1998 (EIA, 2014) and are now about US$108/barrel6 (Bloomberg, 2014). 
 
There is also evidence that higher energy prices tend to be associated with more efficient use of 
energy. In the OECD, despite significant differences between domestic energy prices, the share 
of energy costs per unit of GDP stays almost constant across countries (Neuhoff et al., 2014). 
We return to this issue in Section 6 of this paper. 
 
It would therefore be misleading to claim that climate change policies are a very strong 
determinant of international competitiveness. In reality, other factors mitigate or dominate the 
contribution of environmental regulatory costs to the determination of business location and 
trade decisions (Aldy and Pizer, 2011; Neuhoff et al., 2014). These include variations in the 
prices of energy and raw materials, transport costs, access to markets and labour, reliance on 
                                                 
4
 Using an average exchange rate of €1 = £0.811 in 2012. 
5
 Using an average exchange rate of $1 = £0.640 in 2013. 
6
 On 1 April 2014. Data refer to crude oil Brent Price for May 2014 contracts. 
EU average 
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integrated production processes, customer relationships and the investment environment (see 
for example Dröge, 2013; Hourcade et al., 2007; Antweiler et al.,2011; Ederington et al., 2005). 
 
This means that capital-intensive businesses tend to locate in capital-abundant countries. 
Businesses that manufacture goods with high transportation costs choose locations near to their 
customers and some businesses co-locate with others carrying out similar activities to exchange 
intermediate inputs. Those with significant investments in large fixed physical structures 
generally tend to move less. 
 
Investors also need to assess the potential evolution of climate policies in alternative locations. 
One cannot assume that China or Malaysia will not implement comparably tough energy 
efficiency and carbon emissions policies over the lifespan of a new plant. 
 
Shifts in demand are also powerful drivers affecting decisions about business location. The 
financial crisis of 2007-08, combined with the sustained growth trend in Asia and Latin America, 
led to a phase of over-capacity among European energy-intensive industries, while demand for 
goods like steel, cement and aluminium kept shifting towards emerging countries (Dröge, 2013). 
This opened up new opportunities to choose locations nearer to, for example, a growing 
demand, an increasingly skilled workforce or cheaper resources. 
 
A natural implication of this observation is that it does not matter whether a carbon price is 
enforced or not: investments in new energy-intensive plants are going to shift from mature to 
emerging markets. But as the outcome of having no climate policies at all is unknown, it is 
sometimes easy to hold environmental regulation responsible for what is actually a structural 
change (Branger et al., 2013). 
 
Sometimes trade openness can also shift emissions-intensive production to richer countries, 
even if they have tighter pollution regulations because other offsetting factors, such as income 
gains and technological progress, more than compensate for the cost of regulation (Antweiler et 
al., 2011). Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that the 2013-14 annual Global 
Competitiveness Report by the World Economic Forum (Schwab and Sala-i-Martín, 2013)7 lists 
Switzerland, Germany and Sweden among the top five countries in terms of global 
competitiveness, despite their high energy costs. The UK appears in a respectable 10th place. 
 
A recent study by the European Commission (2013) concluded that European comparative 
advantage increasingly depends on high-value-added goods, with a high degree of sophistication 
or knowledge intensity. It added that manufacturers in the European Union should gradually 
shift away from the current portfolio of predominantly mature products, over which firms 
compete more on price than quality, to more innovative and complex products. This makes 
sense as, for all but the most energy-intensive sectors, small changes in demand for products 
and key costs, such as labour or capital, have a far greater potential impact on profit margins 
than a change in energy costs. 
 
For instance, some specialised high-productivity energy-intensive producers in the UK have 
benefited from climate policies through the additional demand on them to supply materials to 
                                                 
7
 The Global Competitiveness Report considers competitiveness to be affected primarily by institutions, 
infrastructures, the macroeconomic environment, health, education and training, goods and labour markets 
efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication and 
innovation. Energy prices are not among the key drivers. 
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the renewables sector, which has been growing strongly in the UK and continues to be a net 
exporter. The overall effect on these producers’ profits has been positive despite the fact that 
energy costs have increased. This is reflected in the presence of a number of providers of UK 
materials (including glass and steel producers) among the memberships of business lobby 
groups seeking support for the renewables sector. 
 
Nevertheless, for some energy-intensive sectors, energy costs remain an important factor 
affecting business performance. The aim of a successful climate policy must therefore be to 
reduce global emissions in a way that is cost-effective, while also limiting the regional loss to 
output in vulnerable sectors. 
 
The Fourth Carbon Budget is intended to be consistent with the most feasible and cost-effective 
emissions reduction path for the UK economy, and compensatory measures for vulnerable 
sectors are already in place alongside climate change policies. As targets for future dates are 
more ambitious, it is important that policy impacts are monitored and mitigation measures are 
accurately designed or revised. This is discussed further in Section 5. 
 
Policies that stimulate energy efficiency can also help to compensate for residual energy price 
differentials due to differences in natural resource endowments (Neuhoff et al., 2014), such as 
the availability of cheap shale gas in the United States. 
 
3 The risk of competitiveness loss and carbon leakage: what the 
theory suggests 
 
When environmental policies increase costs, businesses can react to them in three ways. First, 
they can decrease costs by improving the energy and/or resource efficiency of their operations. 
Second, they can absorb the policy costs, for example by reducing their profit margin or, in the 
long run, wages. Third, they can pass on the additional costs to consumers by increasing the 
price of their output which can have limited impact on profit margins, but in the long run can 
lead to decreasing market share (Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2014). 
 
While the first effect is the most desirable policy outcome, the second and third can to some 
extent be unavoidable counter effects which can reduce business competitiveness. In some 
cases, if there are no opportunities for input or technology substitution to reduce the damage 
caused by production, then some substitution by consumers away from damaging products is to 
be encouraged and expected as a result of effective policies to regulate carbon. 
 
Governments ultimately worry about the prospect of polluting firms simply relocating to 
countries with looser environmental policy, so-called ‘pollution havens’, which can damage 
national competitiveness and create the risk of increasing global emissions. However, the view 
that environmental regulation can lead to negative economic performance by pollution-
intensive businesses has long been challenged. Notably, Porter (1991) claims environmental 
policies can lead to technological change that has a positive effect on competitiveness. 
 
In reality, the effects of policy on businesses are often mixed. 
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Several ex-ante studies have attempted to explore the hypothetical impact of climate change 
policies, such as the effect of future carbon prices, to estimate whether they would drive up 
relative costs and affect competitiveness. They do so by predicting the outcome of intended 
policies, using simulation or generalised economic models based on given theories, such as cost-
minimising behaviour by profit-maximising producers and average-cost pricing informed by 
broad empirical evidence about the behaviour of firms. They differ from ex-post studies 
(discussed in Section 4), which estimate the impacts of existing policies using actual evidence 
and data gathered after their implementation. 
 
Both ex-ante and ex-post studies often use rates of ‘carbon leakage’ as a proxy for loss of 
competitiveness. While the two terms are related, they are not identical. The latter refers to the 
profitability, output and location decisions of a business or sector, whereas carbon leakage 
refers specifically to the amount of reduction in domestic emissions that is offset by an increase 
in emissions abroad8. For example, 100 per cent leakage means that the entire amount of 
emissions saved as a result of carbon pricing is emitted elsewhere, typically when a plant 
relocates to a country with no equivalent legislation. This implies no net saving in global 
emissions. If production relocates to parts of the world where industrial activities are more 
carbon-intensive, leakage can even exceed 100 per cent. 
 
Ex-ante analyses point to positive but limited leakage at the aggregate level, typically from 10 to 
20 per cent for carbon prices between £10 and £40 per tonne of carbon dioxide. The OECD 
(2009) estimated that, if the European Union cut its emissions by half unilaterally in 2050 (over 
2005 emission levels), only about 12 per cent of this abatement would be wasted through 
carbon leakage. 
 
However, for some carbon-intensive sectors, especially steel and cement, higher leakage rates 
are often forecasted (see Table 19). 
 
In the UK, analysis by the Committee on Climate Change (2008, 2013b) suggests the sectors that 
may be more exposed to carbon prices because of their higher marginal compliance cost 
relative to their GVA, and because they are more exposed to trade outside the UK10, include iron 
and steel, refined petroleum products, aluminium, other inorganic chemicals, pulp and paper 
and rubber tyres. A few other sectors are also considered to be significantly exposed, although 
they play a smaller role in the UK economy, including, malt, coke oven product, non-wovens, 
other textile weaving, copper, and silk and filament yarn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 So, for example: if domestic carbon policies lead to a 5 per cent reduction in emissions, due in part to 
improved efficiency and less carbon-intensive inputs as well as a transfer of emissions to plants abroad, then, 
assuming that the transfer accounted for 1 per cent of the reduction, the leakage rate would be 20 per cent. 
9
 Several studies discuss sector-specific carbon leakage. Examples include: Carbon Trust (2008); Carbon Trust 
(2004); Demailly and Quirion (2006); Hourcade et al. (2007); Houser et al. (2008); Graichen et al. (2008); de 
Bruyn et al. (2008); Dröge and Cooper (2010); Branger et al. (2013). A good summary of the available literature 
can be found in Dröge (2013). 
10
 These are sectors with a non-EU trade intensity of more than 15 per cent. 
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Table 1 Overview of selected ex-ante studies on carbon leakage 
Carbon price 
(£/tCO2) 
Sectors Source 
All Cement Iron & Steel 
10 11-15%     (Kuik & Gerlagh, 2003) 
12 10% 20% 39% (Monjon & Quirion, 2009) 
12  20%  (Demailly & Quirion, 2008b) 
14   9-50%   (Demailly & Quirion, 2006) 
16     0.5-25% (Demailly & Quirion, 2008a) 
16   56-70%   (Ponssard & Walker, 2008) 
16  3-22%  (Quirion et al., 2012) 
16   80-100% ~70% (Linares & Santamaria, 2012) 
17 11% 19% 35% (Kuik & Hofkes, 2010) 
18   9-75% (Ritz, 2009) 
27 5-19%   (Böhringer et al., 2012) 
27  29%  (Szabo et al., 2006) 
27-85  17-100%  (Allevi et al., 2013) 
28   88-100% ~100% (Linares & Santamaria, 2012) 
28-29 15-17%     (Caron, 2012) 
34  0-50%  (Demailly & Quirion, 2006) 
40   67-73%   (Ponssard & Walker, 2008) 
Note: Results generally refer to industrial countries, such as those listed in Annex I of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (United Nations, 1992), or the European Union specifically, where 
studies included different scenarios. Wherever possible, we selected those that did not include cost-mitigation 
measures, such as free allocation of allowances within the EU ETS or border tax adjustment. Carbon prices 
have been converted into £s using average yearly exchange rates for the year of publication 
(http://www.oanda.com/currency/average). 
 
Source: Authors, based on mentioned studies. 
 
Results from ex-ante studies vary greatly, especially those for specific sectors. Notably, leakage 
rates tend to vary significantly with the assumptions made about carbon and energy prices, 
energy- or carbon-intensity, market openness, plant location, the ability to apply abatement 
technologies, transport costs and product substitutability. 
 
The models used also tend to have a number of limitations. For instance, several studies rely on 
static models, which do not allow for substitution by lower carbon technologies, inputs or 
processes, resulting in lower mitigation potential and higher leakage rates. Others may not be 
able to capture factors that improve, rather than deter, competitiveness, such as technology 
spillovers (Bosetti et al., 2009), the crowding out of dirty capital stock (Carbone, 2013) or 
induced fuel substitution in third countries (Bauer et al., 2013). 
 
Despite these limitations, ex-ante theories generally concur that the lack of uniformity of 
climate change policies can raise concerns about competitiveness and carbon leakage. However, 
these impacts are limited to specific industry sectors and sub-sectors. A common feature of 
these sectors is that they are both exposed to international competition as well as relatively 
sensitive to carbon pricing – either because they are large emitters of carbon dioxide, such as 
the steel industry, or because they are large users of electricity, as in the case of aluminium 
producers (or both).  
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The likely degree of relocation of output and emissions is ultimately an issue that needs to be 
addressed by empirical observations. We turn next to the question of whether the predictions 
of the models are matched by experience. 
 
4 The impact of climate change policy on competitiveness: the 
evidence from observations 
 
Although ex-ante studies suggest that carbon pricing can be a concern, at least for some sectors, 
ex-post analyses tend to indicate that  existing climate change legislation has not led to any 
significant loss of competitiveness. 
 
For instance, research carried out by Martin et al. (2011) compares the performance of UK 
businesses subject to the Climate Change Levy with similar businesses subject to the reduced 
tax rates granted by the Climate Change Agreements11. The study considers firms that operate 
in the same economic sectors and share similar characteristics, therefore facing the same 
international competition, regardless of the policy regime to which they are subject12. 
 
Its findings suggest that the Climate Change Levy did not cause businesses to lose 
competitiveness, in terms of employment, output and the likelihood to exit the market, relative 
to those which received a discount through the Climate Change Agreement. The research also 
suggests that those that paid the full levy reduced their emissions more and made larger 
improvements in energy efficiency, reducing energy costs. These findings are further confirmed 
by a more recent study by Bassi et al. (2013), which applies a similar method to a larger sample 
of data for the period from 1997 to 2010. 
 
Several empirical studies also examine the performance of businesses participating in the EU 
ETS. 
 
For instance, Bassi et al. (2013) analyse companies close to the EU ETS eligibility threshold, some 
of which are included in the scheme and some which are not. These are, therefore, companies 
that are subject to different policy regimes (inside or outside the EU ETS), but share similar 
characteristics, such as sector, size, turnover, etc. The analysis reveals no significant difference 
in turnover or employment between businesses inside and outside the EU ETS which belong to 
the same sector. In other words, there is little evidence that the EU ETS has affected the 
competitiveness of firms to which it applies. 
 
Several other economy-wide or sector-specific studies on the EU ETS reach similar conclusions, 
including Martin et al. (2013), Laing et al. (2014), Reinaud (2008), Petrick and Wagner (2014), 
                                                 
11
 The Climate Change Levy is a tax on energy consumption which was introduced in 2001. Since this was a 
unilateral measure adopted in the UK only (although some other Member States have similar policies in place), 
it created concerns about the competitiveness of UK businesses, especially those for which energy represents 
a relatively large share of their costs. This led to the creation of the Climate Change Agreements, which grant a 
discount against the Climate Change Levy for those energy-intensive industries which voluntarily sign up to 
them, in return for meeting targets for energy efficiency or carbon emissions savings. Currently the discount is 
65 per cent for gas, coal and liquid petroleum gas (LPG), and 90 per cent for electricity. 
12
 These could not be assessed, however, against a case where no climate policy applies, as most businesses in 
the UK are covered by either one policy or the other. 
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and Varma et al. (2012). Most analyses do not find any clear link between the EU ETS and a loss 
of competitiveness in most of the sectors analysed, including energy-intensive businesses such 
as steel and cement. Chan et al. (2013) find a slight increase in costs only in the power sector. 
 
The effects on competitiveness may be small because of relatively low carbon prices. In 2013, 
the Climate Change Levy charged between £4 (for LPG) and £10 (for electricity) for each tonne 
of carbon dioxide emitted by regulated organisations. And the price of EU ETS allowances has 
oscillated between almost £0 and £24 (€30) per tonne of carbon dioxide since its introduction, 
and reached a plateau at around £3.50 (€4)13 per tonne of carbon dioxide in 2013 (EEX, 2014). 
 
A relatively wide range of sectors have also received substantial compensation in the form of 
free allowance allocations within the EU ETS and discounted levies for the Climate Change 
Agreements. Compensation within the EU ETS has been so generous that some businesses made 
windfall profits (see, for example, de Bruyn et al., 2010), notably in those sectors with a higher 
propensity to pass through their costs to customers - especially the energy sector (Chan et al., 
2013; Anger and Oberndorfer, 2008; Sandbag, 2011; Laing et al., 2014). 
 
However, should the carbon price increase in the future as a result of the larger emissions 
reductions set out in the Fourth Carbon Budget and in the Budgets to follow, it is reasonable to 
expect the impact on the performance of some businesses to become more perceptible. 
 
Ex-post studies in countries with more stringent climate change policy regimes can provide 
useful insights about the effects of higher carbon prices. For instance, OECD (2013b) estimates 
that electricity carbon prices in Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark are respectively 
around £445, £134, £74 and £64 per tonne of carbon dioxide, compared with about
 £59/tCO2 in 
the UK14. These carbon prices are typically accompanied by some form of revenue recycling 
and/or compensation for energy-intensive companies which mitigates the economic impact. 
 
Overall, several studies have found that existing carbon and energy taxes only have small 
impacts on carbon leakage, economic growth, employment and consumer prices (e.g. Andersen 
et al., 2007;Barker et al., 2007; Vermeend and van der Vaart, 1998; Pwc, 2013). 
 
5 Creating a level playing field 
 
Although current policies have not affected business competitiveness so far, the impact of 
higher carbon prices in the future is more uncertain and ex-ante models warn that some 
amount of carbon leakage may happen in some sectors. With UK carbon prices due to increase 
to meet the UK’s carbon budgets and European emissions targets, the design of policies that can 
prevent undesirable impacts on businesses will therefore be crucial. 
 
Grover and Zenghelis (2014), for intance, explore the impact of an additional carbon price of up 
to US$30/tCO2 (around £19/tCO2
15) on top of existing domestic policies. This is not too far from 
reality: the UK carbon price floor has been set at £18 until 2020 (HMT, 2014) and other policies 
could raise the implicit domestic carbon price further in the medium to long term. Their analysis 
                                                 
13
 Using an average exchange rate of €1 = £0.811 in 2012. 
14
 Using an average exchange rate of €1 = £0.811 in 2012. 
15
 Using an average exchange rate of $1 = £0.640 in 2013. 
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confirms earlier results from Stern (2006) that consumer prices may rise by only a negligible 
amount, but that the impact on some carbon-intensive industries could be significant if no 
compensation is offered. 
 
In an ideal world, the ‘first best’ option to minimise the risk of carbon leakage would be to reach 
agreement on a global carbon price. This would probably be accompanied by some form of 
support for developing countries. A ‘second best’ alternative would be to implement 
agreements in different sectors, applying the same carbon price to domestic and imported 
goods on a sector by sector basis, or some form of border adjustment16 (e.g. a charge on 
imports). The implementation of the latter would require overcoming concerns about the 
measurement of carbon content in final goods, for instance by assuming ‘best-in-class’ carbon 
content, and any equity issues relating to who keeps the revenue (see, for example, Grubb, 
2011). However, none of these options is likely to be feasible in the short term. 
 
International negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) have not yet been able to agree on a common approach, let alone a single carbon 
price, that would apply evenly across all countries. 
 
There is also controversy about the legitimacy of border adjustments under the rules of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) (Horn and Mavroidis, 2011), as well as suspicion that such 
measures may lead to more general protectionism (Evenett and Whalley, 2009). And while 
several studies indicate that, with careful design, border adjustments have the potential to 
provide a credible long-term signal that could help to galvanise early action while complying 
with WTO requirements (see, for example, Helm et al., 2012; Ismerand Neuhoff, 2007), these 
instruments still encounter some political opposition. 
 
Because of these challenges, a range of ‘third best’ options may be required in the short term. A 
starting point would be to set the same domestic carbon price across the economy, rather than 
allowing different prices for different sectors (see, for example, Bowen and Rydge, 2011; Advani 
et al., 2013), so as not to negate the behavioural impact of carbon pricing. Any measure that 
attenuates the carbon price signal would significantly undermine the effectiveness of climate 
policy (Reinaud, 2008; Aldy and Pizer, 2011). 
 
The sectors at risk of carbon leakage should then be compensated in a way that is unrelated to 
their emissions. For example, some firms could receive rebates or other transfers that are 
proportionate to their size or average energy use for their sector. Another option would be to 
reduce non-carbon taxes, such as corporation taxes, so that overall aggregate business costs do 
not increase. 
 
Researchers have highlighted the need to develop political economy positive ‘feedbacks’ as a 
means of making the low-carbon transition politically viable (see, for example, Lockwood, 2013, 
2014). This is because policy signals affect the costs of deploying low-carbon investment, and 
their credibility is key to investment and expectations. A corollary of this is that, in some 
instances, compensation for affected incumbents may not necessarily be justified for reasons of 
competitiveness or efficiency, but may be a prerequisite for political acceptance (Fay et al., 
                                                 
16
 The literature about the economic merits of border tax adjustments is vast. Relevant readings include Helm 
et al. (2012), Cosbey (2008), Wooders et al. (2009), Kuik and Hofkes (2010), Caron (2012), and others. 
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2013). This was the justification, for instance, for allocating free emissions allowances in the first 
phase of the EU ETS. 
 
Assuming significant levels of pass-through of the carbon price, profit neutrality actually does 
not require many allowances to be allocated for free in most sectors (Hepburn et al., 2013). 
Goulder (2013), for instance, finds that only 13.7 per cent of the total allowance would need to 
be given out free in order to preserve the profits of the most carbon-intensive industries. 
Nevertheless, without initial large compensations, the EU ETS would probably never have been 
politically viable in the first place. 
 
However, an excessive focus on political consequences may have the perverse effect of 
encouraging so-called ‘rent-seeking’ by incumbent industries which have an incentive to 
exaggerate the impact of policies in order to receive compensation. The misallocation of 
compensation can generate windfall profits (notably in the power sector) and the only effect of 
this is to raise consumer prices (see, for example, de Bruyn et al., 2010; Hourcade et al., 2007; 
Reinaud, 2008). 
 
Over-compensation also waters down the actual purpose of carbon pricing, which is to reduce 
emissions. In Norway, for example, extensive tax exemptions and relatively inelastic demand 
within the sectors where the tax is actually implemented have led to only small effects on 
emissions reductions, despite relatively high carbon taxes (Bruvoll and Larsen, 2004). 
 
In order to avoid undesirable market distortions, compensation measures are best targeted at 
only those businesses which are effectively at risk of carbon leakage, but this is complicated by 
asymmetric information about compliance costs (Martin et al., 2013). 
 
As noted in Section 4, the compensation mechanisms for current policies are arguably far too 
generous. For instance, the discount on the Climate Change Levy granted by the Climate Change 
Agreement is made available to firms which are either energy-intensive or highly trade-
exposed17. This implies that sectors which are heavy energy users but are not exposed to 
competition outside the UK, such as large retailers or industrial-scale bakeries, qualify for a tax 
discount even if, in effect, they face little risk of carbon leakage (Advani et al., 2013). 
 
Within the EU ETS, currently 164 sectors have been identified as being at ‘significant risk of 
carbon leakage’, and are exempted from the auctioning process. These sectors account for 
almost 90 per cent of the emissions from all sectors covered by the EU ETS, and include 
businesses that are either very carbon-intensive, very trade-exposed, or both18. 
 
An econometric analysis by Martin et al. (2013) found that the criteria used by the European 
Commission to measure trade intensity are not a good proxy for business vulnerability to carbon 
                                                 
17
 From 2006, eligible sectors are those that have an energy intensity (the ratio of energy costs to the 
production value of the sector) of at least 10 per cent. Alternatively, the eligible sectors must have an energy 
intensity of 3 per cent or more and the industry import penetration ratio (the total value of sector imports, 
divided by the sum of UK sector sales and net imports) must be at least 50 per cent or more (DECC, 2014). 
18
 According to the ETS Directive (2009/29/EC), Article 10a, a sector or sub-sector is deemed to be exposed to a 
significant risk of carbon leakage if participation in the EU ETS would lead to an increase in its production costs 
(calculated as a proportion of their Gross Value Added) of at least 30 per cent, or if the trade intensity of the 
sector with countries outside the EU is above 30 per cent. Alternatively, a sector is considered to be exposed 
to risk of carbon leakage if the increase in its production costs is at least 5 per cent and the trade intensity of 
the sector with countries outside the EU is above 10 per cent. 
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pricing. This is a reason for concern, because the trade-intensity criteria represent the route by 
which most sectors currently qualify for EU ETS exemptions. 
 
Therefore, it is important that the right parameters are devised and that careful assessment is 
carried out to identify the correct sub-categories of sectors which need compensation. 
 
The Green Growth Platform (2014) advised EU Ministers that freezing the list of EU ETS sectors 
at risk of carbon leakage would increase policy stability, but pointed out that a thorough analysis 
of the evidence for leakage needs to take place. It recommended: “Europe needs to ensure that 
the list is focused on those sectors genuinely at risk of carbon leakage to ensure that the level of 
support needed is available. Moreover, the risk of ‘investment leakage’ and regional 
differentiation thereof need to be taken into account to ensure that energy-intensive industries 
can compete during the transition to a green economy.” 
 
The design of compensation is also crucial. Lump-sum compensation, for instance, may not 
reduce carbon leakage, as firms may receive the full compensation while moving their 
production abroad so that they can also avoid paying some of the carbon costs. In order to limit 
leakage, this implies that the level of compensation must be proportional to the level of 
domestic output of the carbon-intensive commodity. Only if a business does not reduce its 
domestic output will it be eligible for full compensation (Neuhoff et al., 2014). This constraint 
has, to date, hampered any attempts to remove the link between leakage protection and the 
incentive for emissions reductions. 
 
Several studies also point out that a sector-specific approach is likely to be more effective than a 
‘one size fits all’ compensation scheme (Carbon Trust, 2010; Dröge and Cooper, 2010; Reinaud, 
2008; Sato et al., 2014). Carbon Trust (2010) provides some insights into possible compensatory 
measures tailored for the aluminium, steel and cement sectors. The study finds that free 
allocations under the EU ETS regime appear to be more suitable for capital-intensive sectors 
that have high ‘direct’ carbon dioxide emissions, such as cement and steel. These measures 
should be temporary, and border levelling that is compatible with WTO rules should be explored 
in the longer run. Capital and electricity-intensive sectors, such as aluminium, would instead be 
better incentivised through direct investment support for low-carbon electricity. 
 
Finally, it is also important to recognise that some businesses will unavoidably exit the market as 
demand for carbon-intensive goods and services falls and emissions regulations tighten. If an 
activity creates harmful by-products, some reduction in domestic output from this sector may 
be optimal and would probably have resulted from a uniform global application of carbon 
policies as part of the substitution away from carbon-intensive activities. The size of any such 
reduction depends on the opportunities available to substitute in lower carbon alternatives, and 
compensation should not interfere with this process. 
 
6 National competitiveness, growth and economic performance 
 
The previous sections focused on the impacts of domestic climate change policies on sector 
competitiveness and, specifically, on the risk of carbon leakage for carbon-intensive industries 
that are open to international competition. This section broadens the discussion to cover 
economic competitiveness at the state or regional level, defined as relative economic 
performance in terms of growth in output, output per capita and productivity. 
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At the whole economy level, carbon pricing will provide additional revenues for governments 
that can be used, or ‘recycled’, to increase the efficiency of the tax system and the broader 
economy, for example by reducing taxes on things we want to encourage - like work and 
intellectual activity. This can help increase efficiency and competitiveness across a range of 
carbon-efficient sectors19. 
 
As this section focuses on opportunities, many of which have yet to be realised or are by their 
nature speculative, the evidence base to support arguments about the deployment of specific 
technologies and about future trends can appear to be rather thin. This does not make the 
discussion less relevant and, where necessary, we draw on historical examples which provide 
relevant insights. 
 
As Krugman (1994) pointed out, national economies, unlike companies, cannot go bankrupt on 
account of relative price changes (even if state and local governments can). In the long run, 
changing relative prices lead to changes in comparative advantage and factor resources are 
employed to most effectively exploit these changes. 
 
There are continual changes in relative prices, the pattern of consumption and the structure of 
production. There are also changes due to the advance of technology, increasing per capita 
income and wealth, and the emergence of new global suppliers. 
 
Economies with flexible institutions are better able to cope with structural adjustment 
associated with change, including those with open trade markets, effectively-regulated 
competition policy, low corruption, a strong rule of law and flexible labour markets. 
 
Policies that encourage or at least do not inhibit, the flow of resources from declining and less 
productive activities to growing and more productive activities, and leave economies better able 
to absorb shocks, are most likely to exploit such global transitions. In short, these policies 
increase the capacity of economies and societies to adapt to change (Llewellyn Consulting, 
2013). 
 
Many reforms which increase an economy’s productivity in the long term can be initially 
unpopular and blocked by vested interests. Labour market reform, competition policy or trade 
openness are considered good drivers for long-term growth but are often either costly to 
impose or subject to opposition by special interests in the short term. 
 
There may be strategic reasons to support low-carbon investment. The green economy covers 
several sectors, including transport, energy, buildings, industry and land use. The Confederation 
of British Industry (CBI, 2012a) estimates an investment of £150 billion is required in the energy 
sector over the next 20 years in the UK. The UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills 
(2013) values the green market at £3.4 trillion annually worldwide. 
 
The UK carbon budgets, and the policies that aim to implement them by encouraging low-
carbon investment, provide new business opportunities and generate income for investors in 
the UK precisely because they address growing global resource challenges. 
                                                 
19
 For a rich discussion of the evidence see material presented by Larry Goulder, Ian Parry and others at the 
MCC Carbon pricing conference in Berlin on 22-23 May 2014 http://www.mcc-berlin.net/en/events/event-
detail/article/public-finance-workshop.html 
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As Asia and other parts of the world industrialise, allowing billions of people to adopt 
consumption patterns that previously were limited to a minority of the world’s population, the 
global economy will have to increasingly shift to low-carbon resource-efficient production, 
either as a result of policy or because of market pressures on the prices of resources. 
 
A recent study by Globe International showed that almost 500 climate laws have been passed in 
the 66 countries covered by the analysis, including all of the world’s major economies 
(Nachmany et al., 2014). 
 
Two of the world’s fastest-growing economies, South Korea and China, moved decisively to 
champion high-technology low-carbon growth in stimulus packages in 2008 and 2009, investing 
in efficiency measures and developing fast-growing export markets. China's 12th Five-Year Plan 
also sets strong ‘green’ targets. These countries recognise that investment flows to the pioneers 
in industrial revolutions (Perez, 2002). 
 
The exploitation of shale gas has prompted a sharp reduction in energy costs in the United 
States relative to Europe and Asia (IEA, 2013). According to some claims, this has served to 
attract key energy-intensive businesses, for instance in the chemicals sector, away from more 
expensive European locations to the United States. This ‘re-industrialisation’ is often referred to 
as a clear win for the economy of the United States. However, the actual effect of low gas prices 
on business competitiveness in the United States is still under scrutiny. The International Energy 
Agency (IEA, 2013) notes that, except for the petrochemical sector, there is no evidence that 
low energy prices have led to a resurgence in investment or production. 
 
Furthermore, it is possible to question whether this is in the long-term interests of the United 
States. Firms in the United States may hope to adjust efficiency when they have to after a period 
when they reap the profits from cheap gas. But reducing the incentive for companies to be more 
efficient in their energy use may lead these firms to miss out on developing and deploying those 
productivity gains necessary to compete in an increasingly resource-constrained global economy 
in the 21st century. 
 
The history of the car industry in the United States provides a useful comparison. In response to 
strong pressure from consumers and the car industry itself, the Federal and state authorities in 
the United States have kept gasoline taxation fairly light. As a result, cars built in the United 
States became heavier and less efficient than their European and Japanese counterparts, just 
when energy efficient vehicles were in greater demand globally. However, sport utility vehicles 
(SUVs) and pick-up trucks, which have low fuel economy, were hard to market once energy 
prices rose in response to the rapid industrialisation of China and other economies. Chrysler 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protections on 1 May 2009, and was followed by General 
Motors a month later. The United States government stepped in to rescue both, while Ford 
secured a special line of credit. 
 
Investing in a low-carbon and resource-efficient economy has a price, but it is important to 
differentiate an ‘investment’ cost from a ‘resource’ cost. 
 
The cost of installing an alternative energy infrastructure is higher than continuing with 
conventional fossil-fuel-based infrastructure, when carbon prices are low or not in place. 
Indeed, levelised costs, taking into account amortised capital costs, are still higher for 
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renewables than for most of the cheapest fossil fuel options (EIA, 2013). But this margin is 
beginning to narrow for most renewable technologies (Kost et al, 2013). Many such energy 
systems are likely to be cheaper to run in the future, with lower operating costs than fossil fuels, 
which require costly excavation and transportation. The relative cost of fossil fuels is also 
expected to increase as carbon prices rise. 
 
Solar photovoltaic and onshore wind technologies are already competitive with gas and coal in a 
number of global locations, even without a strong carbon price. The likelihood is that the costs 
of new energy systems, especially for a variety of solar technologies, will fall further, and close 
the gaps with conventional energy sources, even without the application of a strong carbon 
price ─ especially as energy storage and energy distribution technologies improve (see, for 
example, Bloomberg NEF, 2011; EPIA, 2011). Supporting these sectors will accelerate cost 
reductions, and in doing so will increase cost-effective opportunities to substitute out of carbon-
intensive activities. This will reduce the revenue raised from carbon pricing, but lower whole 
economy costs. 
 
The extent to which the costs of new energy systems will fall depends on the purchase, 
installation and running costs of the capital equipment, which is, in part, a function of learning 
and experience. Future reductions also depend on the evolution of fossil fuel costs. Although 
technological developments, such as ‘fracking’, will allow the exploitation of unconventional 
reserves and may alleviate pressures on fossil fuel costs and/or imports in some European 
regions, it remains likely that fossil fuel prices will generally rise under pressure from growing 
demand from industrialising countries in Asia and elsewhere (Dobbs et al., 2011). 
 
Furthermore, there is a large and untapped potential for investment in efficiency technologies 
and processes in the European Union. Sectoral studies show there is still significant potential for 
additional energy efficiency gains, including in the most energy-intensive sectors - see for 
example Neuhoff et al. (2014) on the cement sector, and ECF (2014) on the chemical sector. 
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2013), investments to improve energy 
efficiency are the most cost-effective way to protect industry against rising energy prices and, by 
lowering costs, it could improve business competitiveness. 
 
Analysis by the OECD shows that the robust implementation of energy efficiency measures 
could raise profits in the European Union’s iron and steel sector by 0.5 per cent by 2035, as 
production is expected to shift from the least developed countries to the European Union, the 
United States and India, where policies will lower production costs (Chateau and Magné, 2013). 
Opportunities for emissions reductions also appear consistent with the historical sources of 
competitive advantage in the chemicals sector, which centre around technological leadership, 
innovation and integration (ECF, 2014). Focussing solely on upfront costs is therefore not a good 
way to measure ‘value for money’. 
 
It has been suggested that the current economic environment in the UK means that it is not a 
good time to raise energy costs for businesses and households. However, from a 
macroeconomic perspective, now may be the appropriate time to pay for the changes needed 
to create jobs and growth. 
 
Annual private sector surpluses (the difference between private saving and investment) 
increased to record levels over the past few years, amounting to more than 5 per cent of UK 
GDP (Zenghelis, 2012). However, there is a perceived lack of opportunity which is holding back 
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capital investment. The net returns achievable by leveraging this private saving now, to exploit 
investment opportunities, are uniquely high. Capital costs are historically low and the potential 
to ‘crowd-out’ alternative investment and employment is much smaller than when the economy 
is operating close to full capacity. 
 
The UK economy is recovering but spare capacity is set to remain for many more years. In their 
latest projections, both the OECD (2013a) and the UK Office for Budget Responsibility (2013) 
project the official measure of spare capacity, the UK output gap, to remain negative. This 
means the economy will continue operating below its potential full capacity for several years to 
come. 
 
Table 2 Output gap in the UK (per cent of potential output) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
OBR -2.6  -2.3  -1.8  -1.6  -1.2  -0.7  -0.2  
OECD -2.7   -2.5   -1.7   -1.2   - - - 
 
Source: OECD (2013a) and OBR (2013) 
 
The green sector is a vibrant part of the global economy at the moment. The UK Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (2013) valued sales in the UK low-carbon and environmental 
goods and services sector at £128.1 billion in 2011–12, 4.8 per cent higher than the previous 
year. 
 
Overall, the UK is a substantial net exporter of green goods and services, including to Germany 
and China (Green Alliance, 2013). But the UK private sector is not investing as heavily as it could 
in green innovation and infrastructure because of a lack of confidence in future returns in this 
policy-driven sector. 
 
Part of this lack of confidence is due to concerns about the impact on existing sectors. However, 
the business landscape is likely to continue to change in the coming decades. Industries in the 
UK that are competitive, relative to the rest of the world, belong to a mix of low-to-medium 
energy-intensive sectors such as financial services, business services, the creative industries, 
aerospace, specialist chemicals and pharmaceuticals (CBI, 2012b; Karecha and Meegan, 2013). 
 
The evidence suggests that the UK’s success in nurturing the innovative, high-technology low-
carbon sector has been based on relatively strong domestic policies in the past, combined with 
global leadership and clear political commitments that have boosted investor confidence. 
However, more and more countries are now acting strongly to draw investment into this high-
growth sector. There are 138 countries that now have renewable energy targets and 71 
countries that apply feed-in tariffs for renewable generation (Green Alliance, 2013). 
 
In economic terms, early action is required to resolve key market failures and prevent the lock-
in of wasteful, resource-hungry infrastructure, as well as to drive innovation (Romani et al., 
2011). In turn, minimising the investment cost of such action depends on clear and strategic 
policy direction by the Government demonstrating its commitment to a sector. There are 
genuine risks associated with being over-prescriptive about technologies. For example, some 
people argue that offshore wind is too expensive and likely to be superseded by technologies 
such as solar (Helm, 2012). This is why broad policies such as carbon intensity targets may be 
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better placed to address non-price market failures than renewables targets or subsidies for 
particular technologies. 
 
External factors associated with energy, communications and transport systems mean that the 
value of joining a network depends on how many others are on it. The private sector is highly 
unlikely to risk making changes to existing networks, even if the returns are viable for specific 
technologies, unless the long-term path of policy is credible, and policy risk is minimised to such 
an extent that it enables the hurdle of up-front costs to be overcome. 
 
In addition, innovation requires an understanding of the unintended consequences that result 
from knowledge spill-overs from one sector to another. Market failures relating to information 
and ownership mean investors fear that they will fail to capture the full returns from risky long-
term innovation where the knowledge spill-over to its competitors is free, and as a result will 
underinvest in its development. 
 
In all these cases, private and public costs and benefits diverge, and coordination and 
information problems limit the degree of investment in energy efficiency and waste reduction. 
An innovative and competitive economic transition is unlikely to materialise without a strategic 
steer from the public sector that helps to induce an efficient level of private innovation. 
 
A healthy debate about climate and energy issues is both welcome and democratic. However, a 
lack of clear political leadership, together with mixed or muddled policy signals about energy 
and climate policies, can weaken business confidence and undermine some of the most 
competitive and innovative business sectors. 
 
For example, in the UK, the impact of the 2008 Climate Change Act in setting world-leading 
emissions reduction targets risks being undermined by political threats to weaken its carbon 
budgets. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI, 2012a) warned: ‘‘If the government 
continues with its current approach, there is a real risk that UK green business growth will not 
reach the government’s expectations [….] which could mean the UK losing almost £400 million 
in net exports in 2014-15”. 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
The UK emissions reduction target set in the Climate Change Act and embedded in the carbon 
budgets have led to the development of a number of policy instruments and regulations that 
expose UK business to a domestic carbon price. 
 
As businesses face competition from countries applying different, and in some cases weaker, 
climate change policies, this has raised concerns over a possible loss of competitiveness due to 
higher business costs and the relocation of carbon-intensive activity to less ambitious 
jurisdictions abroad. Ex-ante theoretical studies have tended to give weight to this concern. 
 
However, there is general agreement that only a few sectors and sub-sectors are truly at risk. 
There is also agreement that other factors affect investment and relocation decisions and, in 
most cases, these are stronger drivers than climate change policy. 
 
26 
 
Moreover, relocation of physical plants may make sense only if investors expect the asymmetric 
application of climate policies across competing countries to endure long enough to cover a 
sufficient part of the lifespan of the new capital. Otherwise, future policy changes might render 
investment decisions costly and unnecessary. 
 
Ex-post studies based on actual evidence suggest that current policies have had no significant 
impact on business competitiveness in the UK and the European Union. But this can be partially 
explained by the fact that carbon prices have been low relative to movements in energy prices 
and also the fact that generous compensatory measures are already in place.  
 
Current concerns over the impacts of climate change policies on competitiveness therefore 
appear to be overstated. But analysis suggests higher carbon prices necessary to meet the 
Fourth Carbon Budget could potentially distort production in, and prompt relocation of, some 
energy-intensive sectors. 
 
In the absence of a global carbon price designed to ‘create a level playing field’, at least across 
carbon-intensive sectors, a compensatory border price adjustment might be required to limit 
distortions to production and enhance efficiency. However, at least in the short term, this 
appears unfeasible or undesirable. As a result, individual countries, including the UK, will have to 
rely on domestic measures to limit the threat of industry relocation. These measures can include 
support to compensate vulnerable sectors. 
 
In order to cost-effectively achieve emissions reductions as well as avoid unnecessary relocation 
and limit undesirable distortions to trade and production, such measures need to be designed 
appropriately to target polluting activities in specific sectors. 
 
However, the case for lowering the ambition of climate change efforts, as a weakening of the 
Fourth Carbon Budget would imply, is not justified by competitiveness concerns, not least 
because of the negative impacts this would have on some of the economy’s fastest growing and 
most promising and innovative sectors. Uncertainty about the future climate policy framework 
could potentially cost jobs and affect growth, especially in the current macroeconomic 
environment. 
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